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315. All attempts failed largely due to the inability of the legislators
to agree on what the rule should be, rather than whether there should
be immunity or not. The legislators seem agreed that specific enact-
ments are needed.
A law enacted to accomplish this need should prevent inequitable
liability as well as compensate for injuries after they have occurred.
The present ruling seems to accomplish this. The defamed person
has recourse against the guilty party who uttered the defamatory
remarks, and at the same time the broadcaster, who had no control
over the defamations, is relieved of liability. The familiar objection
to this situation is that the defamed person may have no remedy be-
cause the speaker is impecunious. However, the Court overruled this
possible private detriment in favor of greater public benefits. The
broadcaster now needs no liability insurance which indirectly might
cause the rates for political broadcasts to exceed those of ordinary
air time. Higher rates are expressly prohibited by section 315.39 Also,
the broadcaster need not deny all political candidates the use of the
station's facilities which is the broadcaster's privilege under section
315.40 Such action is against congressional intent and FCC policy.41
Protection for the few who may be deprived compensation is too
expensive if the harm which results is the inhibiting of free political
expression.
FEDERAL PRACTICE-JURISDICTION-IN DIVERSITY CASES FED-
ERAL LAw MUST BE LOOKED TO IN DETERMINING FOREIGN COR-
PORATION'S AMENABILITY TO SERVICE.-The defendant, an Iowa
corporation, being sued in the Southern District of New York on the
basis of diversity of citizenship, made a motion to dismiss the action
for lack of jurisdiction. Service was attempted on the defendant by
serving a vice-president of the Rocke International Corporation whose
principal place of business was in New York City. For five years
Rocke, who was concededly amenable to service, had solicited sales
for the defendant on a commission basis all over the world except in
the United States, Hawaii, Alaska and Canada. The basis for the
defendant's motion was that its activities within New York were in-
sufficient to bring it within the Court's jurisdiction. The Court in
39 48 Stat. 1088 (1934) (amended by 66 Stat. 717 (1952), as amended,
47 U.S.C. §315(b) (1952)).
40 Supra note 39, § 315 (a).
41 Farmers Educ. and Co-op. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 534-35
(1959). The FCC "considers the carrying of political broadcasts a public
service criterion to be considered both in license renewal proceedings, and in
comparative contests for a radio or television construction permit." Ibid.
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denying the defendant's motion held that in determining whether
Rocke's activities on behalf of defendant were sufficient enough to
bring the defendant within the jurisdiction of the Court, federal law
as opposed to state law would apply. Nash-Ringel, Inc. v. Amana
Refrigeration, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
Before Erie R.R. v. Tompkins' the federal courts had applied
their own substantive law. This was done on the basis of Swift v.
Tyson 2 which interpreted the Rules of Decision Act,3 requiring state
law to be applied by federal courts, as only applicable to state statutes,
leaving the federal courts free to apply their own common law. The
Erie decision destroyed the concept that there was a separate body of
federal common law which could be applied in cases where jurisdic-
tion was based on diversity of citizenship.
Procedural law before Erie was controlled in the federal courts
by the Conformity Act 4 which said that the federal courts should
conform "as near as may be" to practice in the state courts. Today
practice in federal courts is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure originally promulgated in 1938.5
The Erie case denied to the federal courts the use of an inde-
pendent body of substantive law because of the discrimination that
resulted from such a practice. A non-resident plaintiff could choose
two bodies of law when suing on a state-created right. The rationale
of the Erie decision was that the result in the federal court should
not be substantially different than it would be in a state court.
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 6 explained that the Erie holding was
based on a policy that ". . . a suit by a non-resident litigant in a
federal court instead of in a State court a block away should not lead
to a substantially different result." 7
In the principal case if jurisdiction were denied because of
a state law the substantive rights of the litigants would be affected.8
Should then the rationale of Erie be applied thereby making state law
'304 U.S. 64 (1938).
241 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
3 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92.
4 Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 197.
5The Enabling Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat 1064, gave the
United States Supreme Court the power to prescribe by rules the practice of
the district courts of the United States. Pursuant to this auhority the Supreme
Court submitted a proposed draft to Congress which became effective in
September 1938. See Daniel K. Hopkins, The New Federal Riles of Civil
Procedure Compared with the Former Federal Equity Rules and Wisconsin
Code, 23 MARQ. L. REv. 159 (1939). The rules are found in FED. R. CIv. P.,
28 U.S.C. (1958).
6 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
7 Id. at 108.
8 Note, 21 ST. JOHN'S L. ZEv. 184 (1947). "To say that a plaintiff has
substantive rights, but he lacks a remedy, is to say the plaintiff is without a
right." Id. at 189. The Supreme Court has said that the state rule as to
burden of proof should be applied in the federal courts because it substantially
affects state-created rights. Cities Service v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208 (1939).
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applicable or should the federal courts be allowed to apply federal
law in determining jurisdiction over a foreign corporation on the
basis that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9 give the federal
courts the right to serve a foreign corporation?
The particular problem in the principal case is, which law should
apply, state or federal, in determining whether the foreign corpora-
tion is sufficiently present within the jurisdiction to bring it within
the power of the district court. After Erie was decided, the problem
of the instant case had been considered only in lower court cases. 10
The Southern District of New York had taken the position that
federal law was to be applied." However, in March of 1959, a
month before the principal case was decided, the Southern District
per Dimock, J., held in Shawe v. Wendy Wilson, Inc.,12 on the basis
of the Erie rationale, that state law should be applied. The Shawe
case pointed out that the Second Circuit had applied state law in
Boinre v. Nordis Sportswear, Inc.'3 The Bonize case was a case
removed from the state courts to the federal courts, but Shawe said
a distinction between removed cases and cases originally brought in
the federal courts was "logically irrelevant." 14
The principal case, in interpreting the reasoning in Boinze (a
case removed to the federal court) and other similar cases '" which
were originally brought in the federal courts, observed that the Second
Circuit has at least intimated that federal law should apply.10
However, from an examination of the Bone case it appears
that the Second Circuit applied state law. There are also cases from
the First,1 7 Third,' 8 Fifth '" and Seventh 20 Circuits which apply
9 FE. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3).
102 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcICE § 4.25 at 969 (2d ed. 1948) states that the
general law applies to whether a foreign corporation is doing business within
a jurisdiction and cites for authority a pre-Erie Supreme Court decision,
Barrow Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898), and a post-Erie district court case,
Hedrick v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 28 F. Supp. 257 (S.D. Ohio, 1939). But see
Partin v. Michaels Art Bronze Co., 202 F.2d 541, 542 n.2 (3d Cir. 1953),
where the comment by Moore is discussed in light of the Erie decision.
11 Satterfield v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 128 F. Supp. 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
12 171 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
13 165 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1948).
14 Shawe v. Wendy Wilson, Inc., supra note 12, at 120.
15 E.g., French v. Gibbs Corp., 189 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1951). The principal
case uses Bomnze to uphold two ideas. The first is that federal courts can
decide how their service should be served. The other is that the federal courts
can determine what foreign, litigants can be brought before it. Nash-Ringel,
Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 524, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
16 The Shawe case points out that the Second Circuit has never expressly
stated that federal law must apply in cases originating in the federal courts.
Shawe v. Wendy Wilson, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 117, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
17 Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1948).is Partin v. Michaels Art Bronze Co., 202 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1953).
19 Albritton v. General Factors Corp., 201 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1953).
20 Canvas Fabricators v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 199 F.2d 485
(7th Cir. 1952).
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state law in determining effectiveness of process on a foreign cor-
poration. The Court in the instant case distinguishes these cases on
their facts from the principal case.
2 1
The Sha-we case follows these circuits' holdings. In so doing it
rejects the concept of a strict dichotomy between substantive and
procedural law, and, basing its decision on the Erie rationale, holds
that the result in the federal courts should not be different than it
would be in the state courts when a state-created right is involved.
The principal case also rejects the strict dichotomy concept, but
it disagrees with the conclusion reached by Shawe. The Court felt
* . that Federal Courts, within the bounds of due process, of course,
have a right to decide how their own process may be served and
what foreign litigants may be brought before them." 22 The Court
goes back to the position of the Southern District prior to Shawe,
that is, federal law should be looked to in determining the effective-
ness of service on a foreign corporation.
23
The United States Supreme Court has not answered the prob-
lem of which law, state or federal, should be applied in determining
whether a corporation is sufficiently present in a jurisdiction to be
amenable to service.2 4  It had decided, before the Erie case, that the
federal courts could obtain jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
when it was not amenable to service of process under state law.25
However, in Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.,26 jurisdiction was
denied to a federal court because state law prohibited the foreign
corporation from enforcing its claim in the state courts on the grounds
that the foreign corporation had not qualified to do business in the
state. The Court said ". . . that where . . . one is barred from
recovery in the state court, he should likewise be barred in the fed-
eral court." 27
This supports the position of the Supreme Court in the Guaranty
Trust Co. case.28  It was there stated that ". . . since a federal court
2 1 Nash-Ringel, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 524, 526
(S.D.N.Y. 1959). The Court says the Pulson case, supra note 17, and the
Partm case, supra note 18, were decided under rule 4(d) (7) and not 4(d) (3)
of the Federal Rules. The Albritton case, supra note 19, was concerned with
service on the Secretary of State, while in the Canvas Fabricators case, supra
note 20, the plaintiff conceded that state law controls.
22 Nash-Ringel, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., supra note 21, at 525.
23 See, e.g., Satterfield v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 128 F. Supp. 669
(S.D.N.Y. 1955). But see Ultra Sucro v. Illinois Water Treatment Co., 146
F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
24 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 325 U.S. 310 (1945), where
the Court formulated a test for determining the constitutionality of suing a
foreign corporation. See Bomze v. Nardis Sportswear, Inc., 165 F2d 33
(2d Cir. 1948), for a discussion of this test in relation to New York law on
presence of a foreign corporation.
25 Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898).
26 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
27 Id. at 538.
28 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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adjudicating a State-created right solely because of the diversity of
citizenship . . . is for that purpose, in effect, only another court of
the State, it cannot afford recovery if the right to recover is made
unavailable by the State nor can it substantially affect the enforcement
of the right as given by the State." 29
To allow the federal courts jurisdiction over foreign corporations
when the state courts did not have jurisdiction would be allowing the
federal courts to substantially affect the recovery of state-created
rights. The Supreme Court when faced with the problem will prob-
ably follow the lead of the Erie and Guaranty Trust Co. cases and
apply state law in determining jurisdiction over foreign corporations.
The conclusion of the principal case is not as sound as that of
the Shawe case. Since it rejects the strict dichotomy between pro-
cedural and substantive law, it would seem that it should then accept
the conclusion that since jurisdiction substantially affects the state-
created rights, state law should be applied to determine jurisdiction.
The reasoning in the principal case does not take into consideration
the strong policy reasons for not allowing the federal courts to affect
recoveries in cases involving state-created rights. The litigants en-
forcing state-created rights should have no greater right in the federal
courts than they would in the state courts.
M
INSURANCE-VARIABLE ANNUITY HELD TO BE A SECURITY AND
SUBJECT TO REGISTRATION WITH SEC.-Petitioner sought to enjoin
respondent from issuing their variable annuity contracts without
29d. at 108-09. But see Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., 356
U.S. 525 (1958). Outcome is not the only controlling factor. The Court
here applies federal rules on presentation of facts to a jury. "The federal
system is an independent system. . . . The policy of uniform enforce-
ment of its state-created rights and obligations, see, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co.
v. York . . . , cannot in every case exact compliance with its state rule ..
Id. at 536-38.
1 The variable annuity is similar to the conventional annuity in the matter
of premium payments, the annuitant making a fixed number of premium pay-
ments during his productive years. The fundamental difference lies in the
matter of investment policy since most of the premiums paid under the variable
annuity are invested in common stock. "Each premium payment, after the
deduction for loading charges, is credited to the annuitant's account in the
form of 'accumulation units.' The number of 'accumulation units' to be
credited is determined by dividing the net amount of the premium payment
by the current value of an 'accumulation unit.' . . . At stated periods there-
after, usually monthly, the basic unit value is adjusted dependent upon the
current investment experience of the common stock portfolio. . . . The unit
value is not affected by the mortality experience or current operating expenses
of the program. These factors are assumed by the insurer who is compensated
[ VOL. 34
